Commentary : demographic changes and international factor mobility by Alan M. Taylor
John Helliwell’s paper examines future demographic shocks and
international factor markets and asks whether the latter will help us
with adjustment to the former. The answer is a qualified “no.”
I am in broad agreement with this conclusion, and it is certainly
consistent with Ralph Bryant’s excellent paper presented earlier.
However, it is the discussant’s task to bring some pressure to bear on the
argument. So I think it would be interesting to explore the evidence a
little further and ask why it is a no and why it is so qualified.
I will focus mainly on issues relating to the global capital market. I
think that has been a major focus for discussion, especially as it relates
to private and public sector financing of old age in the rapidly aging
countries. However, I also want to bring in some important and, I
think, overlooked complementarities between labor market and capital
markets that could significantly affect our calculations of demographic
impacts on both the public and private sectors. Given the caution
attached to forecasts, as John Helliwell, Ralph Bryant, and others have
emphasized, the sensitivity to assumptions and the exploration of other
counterfactuals remain important areas for research.
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421In the limited time available, I will touch on three main issues.
First, what is the extent of globalization today? Has globalization
gone too far or not far enough? Second, how does that globalization
interact with institutions and policy choices? And how does that
affect our forecasting? Finally, although much analysis proceeds under
the assumption that labor and capital mobility are two different
issues, are there potentially important interactions between the two
that we should examine more carefully?
Has globalization gone too far or not far enough?
First, what is the extent of globalization today? Has globalization
gone too far or not far enough? Implicit in the ideal of integrated
factor markets is the idea that factors are arbitraged across borders—
that capital and labor are earning their marginal products in all
locations. I share Helliwell’s overall impression that although mobil-
ity is not negligible, it is not perfectly fluid either.
The border effect is big and pervades all markets; the tyranny of
distance remains; frictions and trade costs, whether due to technology
or policies, are still substantial. This needs to be kept in mind.
However, for counterfactual analysis, we are in slightly better shape
since, abstracting from these frictions, marginal changes in the incen-
tives for factors to move should still have some presumably
predictable impact. And I think we can usefully draw on that idea.
Perfect integration is therefore a less than useful yardstick. A better
yardstick might be provided by past experience. In a recent book,
titled Global Capital Markets (2004), Maurice Obstfeld and I
attempted to provide a unified and quantitative account of the evolu-
tion of global capital markets since the late 19th century. That earlier
epoch is now celebrated as the first age of globalization and provides
one benchmark for our evaluation of international market integra-
tion. What important lessons did our study provide?
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markets was impressive 100 years ago. It is by some measures just as
impressive today. For example, the ratio of global foreign assets to
global GDP has probably surpassed its previous peak in 1913. One
could present similar results for global labor-market integration, for
which I refer you to recent work by Tim Hatton and Jeff Williamson
(2004)—though in the labor market the recent upturn has been
modest, for obvious reasons relating to persistent policy obstacles to
free migration.
Why does history matter? I would argue that we need to under-
stand what caused these wide swings in international factor mobility
in the last century before we start to make forecasts into the future, as
these fluctuations are first-order phenomena.
However, there is another challenge posed by historical data. We
also know that participation in the global capital market is very
uneven today. Very few poor countries attract any foreign capital,
which remains a puzzle for economists, as noted by Robert Lucas
(1990), among many others. Conversely, 100 years ago, the global
capital market sent a much larger share of capital to very poor coun-
tries, as Obstfeld and Taylor (2004) show.
What has changed? Many of today’s developing countries have
weak property rights, poor rule of law, political instability, and other
attributes that lower their productivity. It’s almost a consensus now
that this low productivity is a result of their institutional environ-
ment. In this view, capital is freely able to flow in but has no incentive
to do so, as Alan Greenspan pointed out when referring to the effi-
cient use of savings in recipient countries.
Why the change? It is fair to say there is no agreement here. Some
(for example, Niall Ferguson 2003) believe these institutional gaps
were smaller a century ago because the presence of colonial rulers in
the poorer countries guaranteed good institutions or at least protec-
tion of capital (their own capital). Some argue exactly the opposite,
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institutions today (for example, Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson,
and James Robinson 2001).
However, let me express a little doubt here. This cannot be the
entire story. Even if we take the best available measures of the
marginal product of capital, such as the commonly used Penn Tables,
and we correct for productivity, there is still a large gap between the
presumptive returns to capital in a poor country and in a rich
country. This gap is partly caused by explicit barriers to capital mobil-
ity as well as a variety of distorting policies and institutions that
especially affect cross-border investment. I could delve into the details
of the history of these policy outcomes, but that would be digressing.
However, I also think it is fair to say that the scope for manipulat-
ing the policies does exist for most countries. As noted in a recent
paper by Glaeser and others (2004), the actual rules and policies
adopted in countries can vary a great deal, even holding initial insti-
tutions fixed. And these policies are changing rapidly in some
countries. Thus, our focus might turn from the “elusive quest for
institutions” and go back to the more pragmatic level of policy
design, something closer to what we as economists and policymakers
might actually influence.
Policies, institutions, and global factor markets in the future
“Why is any of this important?” you may ask. As we assess the likely
path of capital flows under future demographic change, ceteris, as the
saying goes, are unlikely to be paribus.
At the outset, here, let me strongly endorse one point that Helliwell
made very clear in his paper and that relates to the approach taken by
Ralph Bryant. The predicted demographic shocks are so closely
synchronized across rich and poor countries that we cannot expect
very significant differences in demographic structure to open up and
induce large and persistent capital movements. The peak in active
424 Alan M. Taylorshare is quoted as 2010 in Europe, North America, and Oceania;
2015 in Asia; and 2020 in South America. Only in Africa is it signif-
icantly later (much later), but Africa is, sadly, likely to continue to
have such a trivial GDP weight in the world economy that it cannot
possibly sustain large capital outflows to finance everybody else’s
retirements.
In the long run, the world as a whole will age and the pressures will
have to be met through domestic adjustments. But even in the short
run we face a paradox.
If rich countries are to adjust to the demographic shock through
reversed capital flows from poor countries, then some poorer “demo-
graphic surplus” countries had better grow rapidly and attain
significant macro weight in the world economy.
Large and rich countries can only obtain a fairly elastic supply of
foreign capital if some parts of the rest of the world grow substan-
tially. Now, under optimistic assumptions, such growth can happen if
institutions and/or policies change in a growth-favoring way in at
least some developing countries. Recent research by Michael Klein
(2003) indicates that for some emerging market countries with suffi-
cient institutional quality, opening capital markets can generate
substantial and significant growth.
But here’s the rub: These very same changes in poor countries’
economic environments, while they can bring about the rapid growth
that will enable them to contribute to a greater share of world savings
supply, also, at the same time, rapidly raise these countries’ own
domestic marginal product of capital and, hence, investment demand.
The demographic forces pushing capital out are, in this scenario, met
by neoclassical convergence forces pushing capital back in.
To provide an example, in a couple of papers about a decade ago
(Taylor 1995, 1998), I tried to compute what would happen when
two kinds of shocks hit Latin America: the predicted demographic
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economic policies. The latter I took to mean efforts, through trade
reform and other policies, to lower (but not fully erase) the high rela-
tive price of tradable capital goods—thus encouraging accumulation
and growth through the mechanism stressed by Brad DeLong and
Larry Summers (1991) and many others.
The results were startling: While demographic change alone would
turn the region into a net capital exporter, the assumed shift in economic
policy would, on its own, generate large net capital inflows of similar
magnitude. Put the two in the mix together, and the effects could easily
cancel. And the same forces are at work in the world as a whole.
On net, it is not at all clear that such developments will free up any
capital for outflow to the rich countries. It could even go the other
way, implying simply a global increase in the excess demand for
capital and, inevitably, higher real interest rates in the world.
This observation prompts two qualifications. First, these kinds of
current account reversals might still have enormous consequences for
some developing nations. For example, a plus 3 percent demographic
swing on current account in Argentina would be a very welcome
relaxation of their wealth and external capital constraints.  How such
a surplus would be dissipated is another question, and emerging
markets in this position already face other serious problems on their
fiscal side, especially in the pension systems, as Anne Krueger noted
in her luncheon address yesterday.
Second, and I think this is a very important point, all of this is
partial equilibrium, treating demographic paths as given and working
life as given. But they might not be. David Bloom, David Canning,
Adair Turner, and others drew attention to possible endogenous
behavioral changes or exogenous policy changes that could make a
very big difference to these projections.
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ically change if the labor market situation changes so as to permit
more migration into the developed countries. Because, to go back to
the marginal conditions mentioned earlier, even if frictions exist, on
the margin every extra migrant worker admitted attracts an inflow (or
deters an outflow) of some quantity of capital. Factors, in other
words, chase each other. And we can’t do meaningful counterfactual
policy analysis without allowing for this. This underscores the impor-
tance of considering both factor markets together in general
equilibrium, even in forecasts already as heroic as these. As Ralph
Bryant noted yesterday, however, this is very tricky.
Before concluding on the topic of institutions, I want to say some-
thing about debt limits, both in North and South. Several
participants have expressed doubt about the ability of the South to
absorb big capital outflows from the North, which might putatively
fund later retirement income in the North. International net foreign
asset positions are always likely to be subject to some limits. These
limits are almost always going to be tighter in the riskier developing
countries, what Carmen Reinhart, Ken Rogoff, and Miguel Savastano
term “debt intolerance”—another manifestation of country risk. But
this is still consistent with the scenario I outlined. The very countries
that are engaging in policy and institutional change, as we have just
said, are the ones capable of financing rich countries in demographic
shock. But they also will be moving toward greater “debt tolerance”—
another reason why net flows might move toward them and not away.
Furthermore, one can’t mention the concept of debt intolerance
without adding another worrisome note. We shouldn’t necessarily
think that some kind of debt limit would not also apply, albeit at a
high level, if a rich country attempted to crank its net debt position
up to several hundred percent of GDP or higher to try to finance its
retirees through endless borrowing.
Some rich countries, in line with certain life-cycle models, have at
least accumulated some net foreign assets as “middle-aged” societies
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as they transition to being “old-aged” societies. These countries
include Japan and, to varying degrees, the European countries (but
not the United States).
But even with the usual theory in mind, it seems that the demo-
graphic shock could still be so large as to force even countries like
these, with high net wealth, to confront some kind of policy adjust-
ment to keep the public side of their accounts sustainable. The
public-sector debit side looks especially weak due to medical and pay-
as-you-go social security liabilities. As we have seen in this conference,
it is these deficits that pose the biggest demographic challenge.
The United States enters this process in a peculiar and hard-to-
judge position. Its net foreign assets are strongly negative, though it
is hard to say exactly how sustainable this position is. Changes in real
exchange rates, as we are experiencing at present, could in principle
help adjust the private side of the current account. It is harder to see
what might adjust the public side of the saving-investment balance,
namely the government deficit and especially the pay-as-you-go
component. We do enjoy our “exorbitant privilege” of low returns on
our foreign liabilities and high returns on our foreign assets. But how
long will it last? If deficits do matter, a view not popular on the banks
of the Snake River, then we might have to worry about debt intoler-
ance too.
Complementarities
Let me finally turn to the question of capital-labor complementar-
ities and whether they change the picture. For illustration I will focus
on a typical developed country, and especially the fiscal position
(again reflecting the emphasis in the conference).
Immigration is one supposed safety valve. John Helliwell gives a
great survey of this area and, rightly, stresses the limits to this dimen-
sion of factor mobility. It appears to be too politically sensitive for
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Ralph Bryant, Helliwell also points out the limited potential for this
policy to improve the fiscal side, given the public goods burden that
offsets the boost to tax collection.
But I have some doubts here. If each extra imported worker (the
marginal worker) represents a negligible fiscal gain, how can the mass
of domestic-resident workers (the mass of average workers) be such a
fiscal plus? And a plus they must be if having them around keeps the
pay-as-you-go system afloat.
There are two answers, I suppose: The average immigrant costs
more in public spending, or generates less in taxes, than the average
native person. Perhaps both of these claims are open to question and,
even if true, they could be amenable to policy change.
As Michael Mussa pointed out yesterday, these migrants bring with
them enormous human capital. Migrants also see a huge increase in
their productivity just from landing on these shores. History confirms
the same point, and as Gregory Clark has noted in his study of 1910
cotton mills, U.S. immigrants from low-productivity countries
become highly productive once in the United States. Aggregate
productivity thus appears to be a location- or nation-specific attrib-
ute—a mysterious amalgam of social, cultural, and institutional
factors (Clark 1987; Clark and Feenstra 2002).
A comparative advantage for the United States and other devel-
oped countries is education, including adult education and training
on the job in world-class industries using world-class technologies.
Migrants know this, so initial human capital can be leveraged into
even greater skills after arrival. As David Canning noted, return
migrants come back to developing countries having picked up a lot
of human capital.
So enabling assimilation is crucial, and since education is involved,
this is an important public policy question. The status quo is not
Commentary: Demographic Changes and International Factor Mobility 429terrible, notwithstanding occasional propositions passed in the state
of California; but it might not be optimal either. One might hope
that through this human capital acquisition and access to all tiers of
the very open education system, especially at the adult level,
migrants, despite whatever “low quality” they arrive with, could see
their earnings (and hence their taxes) rise, and their burden on the
public purse shrink.
So much for thinking about labor migrating to the United States or
any other rich country. If that doesn’t happen, then our standard
neoclassical model suggests that factor-market pressures will be
resolved another way: by outflow of capital. 
Suppose the choice is more home capital going abroad or more
foreign labor coming here. I think there is another fiscal issue here. It
is a great deal easier to tax residents’ labor income than offshore capital
income. The efficiency effects are nearly equivalent: GNP goes up in
both cases. But offshore capital income is unlikely to yield tax at the
same rate as domestic labor. (Indeed, such conditions could encour-
age even more of it to migrate.)
To take an example, consider U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI),
in a low-tax country, say, Ireland. Evidence suggests that profits are
overbooked in low-tax FDI host countries, perhaps in part by under-
invoicing intrafirm exports from the United States or overinvoicing
intrafirm exports to the United States. This generates some account-
ing illusions: a U.S. investment account credit and a trade account
debit. The trade deficit worsens but the current account does not
change. Another illusion is that U.S. foreign investment appears to be
very profitable (Lane 2003).
In this case, our GNP gain from factor movement generates little
tax for the United States, since labor income falls and the taxes on
offshore capital are lower than at home. (It does generate plenty of tax
revenue for the host country: Wage income goes up and there is a
possibly modest tax from capital). One option is to harmonize tax
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political issue in 2004.
I do not know if these differential tax treatments and loopholes are
fully captured in the simulation exercises by Ralph Bryant and others.
But one thing is clear: If U.S. gross foreign investment positions
expand due to capital being pulled on net into other countries, then
the revenue effects of transfer pricing and other tax-shifting strategies
could turn out to be significant. No doubt, this would be a very tricky
microeconomic tax problem to analyze.
But a general equilibrium view suggests that the other option for
resolving the factor-market disequlibrium has quite different tax
effects: If more offshore workers came to the United States, they
could employ also more capital within the border, and this would
generate more U.S. labor and capital income, with associated U.S.
taxes on both. If, as suggested earlier, those foreign workers also get a
“magical” productivity boost from migrating or can enhance their
human capital quickly on arrival, then the gain is even bigger.
These effects may depend on initial migrant quality, but they may
be available to all workers—after all, the late 19th century data show
that the productivity gains were there for migrants arriving from very
low productivity source countries (Clark 1987).
I think this example illustrates how issues affecting the two factor
markets are linked to each other and to the fiscal accounts. Given that
the developed countries already have liberalized their capital markets,
the question about complementarity forces us to direct our gaze back
at the labor market. Never mind the economics, you might say: Is
more migration even politically feasible?
Migration could be maintained at present levels by rich countries,
but they probably would not expand their labor inflows, as Helliwell
notes. Still, calls for more migration can be heard. Philip Martin
(2004), writing for the Copenhagen Consensus, has emphasized the
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Rodrik (2002) forcefully argues that this is the biggest factor-market
failure out there. But, as has been noted, translating a global gain into
national Pareto gains is elusive: The problem comes from distribution
impacts.
An aside here is that the biggest gains from more open labor
markets will most likely emerge from the integration of markets for
unskilled labor—not skilled labor, as these and other authors have
argued. It is in unskilled labor markets that the international wage
gaps are largest. And if one takes a Heckscher-Ohlin view, this change
might have the benefit of diminishing inequality in the developing
world, albeit worsening inequality in the rich world (Wood 1994).
Thus, I do worry about Helliwell’s optimistic assessment of the
outsourcing of IT jobs to India and the happiness, communitarian
benefits, and enhanced social capital that might ensue. This outsourc-
ing of skilled jobs is a substitute for skilled migration from India (not
unskilled). And it does not enrich the abundant poor in India, but
rather the scarce, well-off, skilled workers. Granted, these
outsourcings are currently small in number. But if they grow we
might fear that not only will income inequality suffer in India, but, if
social capital is mediated by a social gradient wherein status matters,
we might expect all kinds of human development indicators to
worsen in India (Marmot 2004).
But will migration ever be allowed to reach levels where its macro-
economic impacts are significant? Again, history suggest skepticism.
Perhaps the last migration backlash in the early 20th century is easy
to understand—demand curves usually slope down and workers
know it; externalities would have to be demonstrably big to convince
economists otherwise; if economists are not yet convinced, vulnera-
ble workers who vote are probably even more skeptical, even if steady
growth might mask some of the effects of inflows (see Hatton and
Williamson 2004).
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transparently understood today (that is, we know capital chases
labor). Building a coalition in favor of migration is possible if all of
the tradeoffs are fully understood and the whole is sold as a package
of costs and benefits (as with trade reform). If so, there may be poten-
tial for factor markets to play some role in the adjustment process in
the short run. We should then be cautious in inferring big effects
from a literature that has been so partial equilibrium in its focus and
from extrapolating into a future where policies and institutions at
home and abroad might change dramatically.
However, in the long run, I would agree that the path is clearer. The
whole world will age. I would envisage the adjustment outlined by
Peter Lindert in his recent book, Growing Public (2004). As social
security burdens grow and tax bases shrink, the adjustment will be
primarily domestic, a combination of reduced benefits (including
later retirement ages) and higher taxes. In the end, the rest of the
world’s labor and capital can change this mix on the margin, post-
pone adjustment a little, but factor markets are not so well integrated,
nor the shocks so asymmetric, that the global shock can be avoided
for long.
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